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Abstract
The established literature on voter behavior suggests that voting typologies can
be generally defined as follows: (1) voters participating in all elections, (2) voters
participating in state and federal elections only, (3) voters participating only
in federal elections, and (4) voters participating only in presidential elections.
My thesis investigates whether there are some voters who fall outside of these
established voting typologies and focus their civic eﬀorts towards nonpartisan
or local issues elections. Utilizing data from the Ohio Secretary of State, I used
Q methodology factor analysis to distinguish voter types. While I was unable to
establish a local-specialist voter type, I was able to find groups of biennial federal
specialists and habitual voters. Using hypotheses for the characteristics local
specialists might have in common, I performed multivariate regression analysis
to explain the diﬀerence between these federal specialists and the habitual voters
who participated in local elections. I found that the habitual voters tend to
be less partisan and from more rural counties, and turnout more often when
elections have tax issues on the ballot and less often when elections have bond
issues on the ballot. I found no indications that these habitual voters tend to
be older or have specializations in local or miscellaneous issues (as defined by
the Ohio Secretary of State).
iii

Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my thanks to my roommate, Hange dy Daurenuly
Kaupynbaev, whose knowledge of the English language far surpasses my own
and whose editing skills turned this thesis into a quality piece of writing. I also
wish to thank my mother, Leslie Sue Means, my father, Douglas Keith Milby,
and my grandmother, Carolyn Cary Hall, each of whom allowed me to include
in this thesis a brief account of their voting history. An extra special thanks
goes to my stepfather, Merle Edwin Means, who allowed me to use some of
his recent political history as an illustration. Finally, my greatest thanks go to
Professor Kenneth Norman Bickers from the Department of Political Science
at the University of Colorado. Over the course of two years, he taught me
how to conduct (and even more importantly, how not to conduct) social science
research, all the while trading intellectual ponderings and terribly corny jokes.
Writing an honors thesis is an awfully diﬃcult task, and without his wisdom
and humor, this work wouldn’t have happened. The process, I think, can best
be represented by these lines from Morality by Matthew Arnold.
We cannot kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides;
The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides.
But tasks in hours of insight will’d
Can be through hours of gloom fulfill’d.
With aching hands and bleeding feet
We dig and heap, lay stone on stone;
We bear the burden and the heat
Of the long day, and wish ‘twere done.
Not till the hours of light return,
All we have built do we discern.
v

Contents
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 7
1 Modeling Individual Turnout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Judging the Past, Predicting the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Assigning Responsibility to Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Theory and Hypotheses 17
4 Research Design 19
1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 The Case for Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Data Strengths and Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1 Data Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Random Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 Q Methodology Factor Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 Bivariate Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Data Analysis 27
6 Conclusion 33
References 39
Appendix: Missing Data 43
vii

List of Tables
5.1 Q Methodology Factor Analysis Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Variance Explained by Each Factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3 Bivariate Regression of Factors on Participation-Proportions. . . 28
5.4 Regression Estimates for Characteristics of Factor 1. . . . . . . . 30
5.5 Regression Estimates for Characteristics of Local Election Par-
ticipants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.1 Summary Statistics for Land Area of Ohio Counties. . . . . . . . 34
6.2 Turnout Rates in Ohio for Presidential and Midterm Election Years. 35
ix

List of Figures
2.1 A simple model of voter specialization with functional assignment
by government administrative level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 A simple model of voter specialization with satellite groups form-
ing unique specializations outside of conventional voter typologies. 15
6.1 Land Area Distribution of Ohio Counties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
xi

Chapter 1
Introduction
On November 4th, 2008, for the first time in my life, I cast a vote for president
of the United States. Though this was not the first election in which I had
participated (my first was the midterm election in November, 2006), it was the
first with such widespread national and even international interest. Joining me
on that day, in addition to the rest of the voting public, were my mother, my
father and grandmother, each of whom has a varied and diﬀerent voting history,
but whose voting behavior in part inspired this research.
My mother first voted in 1984 when Ronald Reagan ran for reelection against
Walter Mondale. She was encouraged by her grandfather to vote for the Repub-
lican candidate, because he would “protect their money”—an interesting notion
since she had nowhere near enough money to require any “protection.” Not
long after, she and my father moved from Ohio to California. By the time the
next election came around, Vice President George H. W. Bush was running for
president, and I was just shy of two months old at the time. I was a colicky,
fussy baby that required lots of attention, so she couldn’t be bothered to vote.
Starting in 1992 with Bill Clinton’s first presidential race, she voted for the
Democratic candidate at the urging of her grandmother, who informed her of the
family’s long-standing progressive ties (“our family always votes Democratic,”
her grandmother used to say). Up to and including the election of Barack
Obama to the presidency in 2008, my mother has cast ballots in the presidential
elections and in two midterm elections (2006 and 2010). Her interest in politics
was always marginal at best, with a slight increase in interest occurring briefly
during the 2008 presidential election. It has since receded once again.
My grandmother’s voting history is not much diﬀerent, though her story
certainly is. She is a woman who thinks of herself as a “rebel”—someone always
trying to separate herself from the mainstream. She gave birth to both of her
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children during her latter teen years. She first voted, just before the birth of my
mother, for John F. Kennedy in November of 1960. By the time her children
were in high school, she found herself the mistress of a Catholic millionaire who
was unable to get a divorce. During their time together, he became more and
more controlling of her everyday life, and she was eventually forced to break
oﬀ all contact with him. She found herself in an old van with her dog, heading
west to explore the rest of the country.
Eventually she made her way to Colorado, where she took up residence in
a small cabin in the woods outside of Redstone. As you might imagine, her
voting history is quite fractured. Rarely was she in a place long enough to find
herself eligible to vote, nor did she have any interest in voting for a government
she had since found both hypocritical and highly objectionable. Once her life
had “settled down” in Colorado, she was stable enough to vote, but only did so
occasionally, and then only for president. In the Marble, Colorado firehouse,
sitting on an upturned bucket, she once cast a vote for a third party candidate
whom she cannot remember (we eventually determined it was H. Ross Perot,
though she could not recall whether it was in 1992 or 1996), and always for
Ralph Nader whenever he was a candidate.
My father describes his voting history as being “fairly straight forward.” He
has always voted in presidential elections, but no others outside of the general
election like primaries or special elections. He has always voted for a candidate
rather than against a candidate, and has shown up only to support a particular
candidate or issue that he felt strongly about. He has no party aﬃliation, and
chooses only to vote when he feels educated enough to cast a ballot intelligently.
In almost every election, one will see people involved in get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) eﬀorts, trying to mobilize voters described as “chronic nonvoters”
(Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). Eﬀorts to mobilize unreliable voters can often
make or break a candidate’s chances in an election, especially if that election is
likely to be close. GOTV eﬀorts are often touted to be the deciding factor for
increasing turnout when a person’s propensity to vote is low (Arceneaux and
Nickerson 2009). Reasons why some voters chose to vote with regularity and
others are either unaware or indiﬀerent to an election diﬀer.
Some voters, like my grandmother, are only interested in top-of-the-ticket
oﬃces such as president, senator or governor, and have little interest in the
“insignificant” oﬃces that occur further down the ballot. Others may have
an interest only in specific issues, and look only for elections and candidates
relevant to those issues. Still others may only be concerned with the candidates
themselves, rather than the oﬃces or issues, as my mother did in 2008, and cast
their votes specifically for people over other concerns. Flanigan and Zingale
(2010), in their text on American voter behavior, suggest that the diﬀerence in
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turnout between elections and in votes cast for top-of-the-ticket versus further
down-ballot candidates is the result of five factors:
1. Diﬀerence in media coverage based on the nature of the election.
2. How voters see the significance of the oﬃce.
3. Salience of issues raised during the campaign cycle.
4. How attractive (physically, politically, etc.) a candidate appears to voters.
5. How contested the election is likely to be.
These factors led Angus Campbell (1966) to define a classification of elections
as being either high-stimulus or low-stimulus. However, what this information
does not indicate are the natures of the voters themselves and why they choose
to turnout (or not) for a specific election. For some voters, these five factors
may have no eﬀect on their likelihood to turnout to an election, and for others,
the eﬀect may be extremely pronounced. In some elections, most of these de-
terminants are non-existent, such as a race for a local school board in a small,
isolated community. Yet, people continue to turn out for these elections, sug-
gesting that there may be other stimulating factors influencing the decision of
whether or not to vote.
Voters are generally classified into two categories. The first are habitual
voters. These voters, as the name implies, participate in as many elections as
they can. My mother has become a habitual voter in recent years. She votes in
every general election, often asking for my advice on how to vote because she
thinks it is important enough to participate but lacks confidence in her ability
to make the “right” choice on her own. She also votes in primaries and special
elections whenever they are held. Thus far, I also count as this type of voter,
since I have participated in every election available to me since I became eligible
to vote.
The diﬀerences in turnout for oﬃces across time come from the second type
of voter, the episodic voter. These are voters who do not participate regularly
in any elections, but pick and choose through the myriad of options over the
course of their voting lifetime and cast ballots for those races in which they
are inspired to participate. These voters form specializations around certain
types of elections, like the biennial federal contests or presidential elections, and
participate only in those elections, rather than every election available to them
like the habitual voters. These episodic voters may be motivated by the five
factors suggested by Flanigan and Zingale, and turn out only for elections that
rank high on these factors. However, some voters may participate in elections
where these factors rank quite low, like local contests, when they feel their vote
really can make a diﬀerence or when the issues are particularly meaningful.
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My grandmother seems a classic example of an episodic voter. She has
voted for only a handful of presidents in her seventy-two years, and none with
any regularity. Even knowing her as I do, it’s hard to see a pattern in her
electoral behavior that could be described as habitual. My father might appear
to be episodic from a participation standpoint, though controlling for a specific
issue or issues that are salient to him would cause his behavior to become more
habitual. Other instances of episodic voters are prevalent in many races in the
United States. The diﬀerences in total turnout for a president’s first election
versus those for his reelection imply that the number of episodic voters has
changed, because habitual voters—by their very nature—are always present in
the voting base, though additional changes occur as voters die and new voters
register.
From these types of voters another distinction must be made: some of the
voters are partisan voters, while others are nonpartisan. At the national level,
this information is much less important due to the high visibility of the race.
Whether or not voters are aware of the nominees’ partisan aﬃliation before cast-
ing their votes, the inclusion of partisan labels guarantees that knowledge after
receiving a ballot. Even if they were non-partisan voters, it would be impossible
to determine from the available data. However, at the local level, party identi-
fication of candidates or issues may be unknown to voters, or may be entirely
non-existent if the race itself is a non-partisan race. At this level, partisanship
can disappear, leaving an entirely new set of cues as the determining factor in
voters’ choices.
Adrian (1958) oﬀers a typology of nonpartisan1 elections with distinctions
between levels of partisan involvement. These typologies diﬀer by the prevalence
of voters’ knowledge about partisan support for candidates even though party
labels do not appear on ballots. His first type (Type I) are elections where
only those candidates supported by a major party have any chance of being
elected. Voters view these contests as interchangeable with partisan elections.
His second type (Type II) allows for candidate support to come from both
parties and interest groups, with parties given a somewhat diminished role. His
third type (Type III) eliminates the presence of political parties and allows for
candidate support to come only from interest groups. Finally, his fourth type
(Type IV) are elections where neither parties nor groups have any particular
role in endorsing candidates. He found this fourth type to be quite common,
especially in small-population areas of fewer than five-thousand residents, where
politics is far more of an inter-personal activity. The characteristics of this fourth
type of nonpartisan election, coupled with its apparent frequency in small towns
1For common characteristics of nonpartisan elections, see Adrian (1952).
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and cities, suggest that this may be the place where the factors identified by
Flanigan and Zingale are not influential on turnout. Instead, voters respond to
a diﬀerent set of motivators.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there remains one final voter type: the
non-voter. This person abstains from voting at all times and is likely to not be
registered (at least by their own doing). Usually, this voter-type is combined
with habitual voting and is considered a habitual non-voter.
It is my suggestion that the definition of habitual voters needs to be adjusted.
A habitual voter may cast his or her ballot in every local election, but pay no
attention to elections for state or national oﬃce. Likewise, a habitual voter
may cast a ballot for every presidential race but have no interest in any down-
ballot candidates or races. A habitual voter might even focus exclusively on an
issue set, such as education, and only vote in elections with education-related
items, and within that election ignore anything not related to education. What
a habitual voter does is consistently votes in a given election or elections.
In any case, habitual voters are the core of any election’s turnout—always
present and always voting. My father is an example of this kind of habitual
voter, in that he casts a vote regularly for president of the Untied States.
What may be the case is that some voters that appear to be episodic voters
(those without any obvious regularity in voting) may actually be habitual voters
with specializations. These voters may find themselves specializing in a type
of election—such as partisan or non-partisan races. Or perhaps they are voters
who specialize in participating only when a certain local issue is raised, such as
a farmer voting for a ballot initiative regarding water rights or a family voting
for a mill levy intended for closing a school district’s budgetary shortfall. These
voters would appear to be episodic voters, perhaps voting in a primary election
here and there, a general election once and a while, and an occasional midterm
race.
Because of the use of the anonymous Australian ballot, we cannot know
specifically how each person voted. However, knowing the content of those
ballots may allow some insight to be extracted from the available data. My
research question can be stated as follows: Are there clusters of voters falling
outside of the traditional voting typologies who specialize in local non-partisan
or issues elections?
Exploration of this question will be accomplished with data provided through
the Ohio Secretary of State.2 These data consist of validated voter files, updated
on a weekly basis, which include (among other things) voters’ names, addresses,
political jurisdictions, party registration, and election participation since the
2These data are available for download from the website of the Ohio Secretary of State at
http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/voter/f?p=111:1. Link valid as of February 5, 2013.
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year 2000. Also available from the Ohio Secretary of State are descriptions of
ballot content and turnout figures for those elections, which includes votes cast
for both candidates and ballot issues.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The discussion of voter types naturally stems from an overall discussion of voter
turnout and the factors that contribute to an individual’s choice to show up at
the polls. By standard definition, habitual voters choose to turnout for most or
all elections, while episodic voters choose to turnout in relatively few contests.
1 Modeling Individual Turnout
In 1957, political scientist Anthony Downs published a treatise about voter
behavior. In it, he proposed a model by which economic theory could be used
to analyze political decision-making. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) used Downs’
proposals to construct a mathematical model of vote turnout choice in “A Theory
of the Calculus of Voting,” upon which most subsequent models were based or
from which they were altered. This model is:
R = PB   C (2.1)
where
R = the utility of voting.
P = the probability of casting a decisive vote.
B = the benefits perceived of having one candidate win over another.
C = the costs incurred by the act of voting.
R is the indicator of turnout, the indicator of the utility or reward of par-
ticipation. If R  0, turnout will not occur. Any positive value of R gives a
voter the incentive to turnout for an election. P is how likely the vote of the
individual is to bring about B, which represents the benefits of the election of
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one candidate over another. P is represented as a percentage (in decimal form),
with the value 0  P  1. The interaction term PB in this model represents
the benefits of voting. Finally, C represents all costs associated with turning
out for an election, both explicit (such as income lost from missing work) and
implicit (such as time lost that could be spent doing other things that would
bring greater utility).
The outcome for an individual voter is simple: whenever PB > C, voting
will occur, and when PB  C, the costs outweigh the benefits, and voting will
not occur. The failing of this model occurs most prominently at the national
level. The probability P of casting a decisive vote is essentially zero for any
one person because of the large number of voters participating in national and
state-level elections. Thus, turnout R would essentially be determined by  C,
meaning that according to this model, no one has an incentive to vote in national
or even most state-wide races.
The only place where this model may be viable is at the local level, albeit
dependent upon the size of the local race (i.e. small rural community vs. large
metropolitan area). In a small local race, the probability P of a single person’s
vote making a diﬀerence is larger than that of national and state-level elections.
Additionally, given the characteristics of Adrian’s (1958) Type IV elections, lo-
cal races in small population areas play by a diﬀerent set of rules than larger
metropolitan, state-wide or national races. It is in these races where the bene-
fits PB and costs C can be substantially diﬀerent, since politics can (and often
does) take on an inter-personal aspect, which Adrian calls the “politics of ac-
quaintance” (1958, 457). However, even in these Type IV elections, the altered
benefits PB may or may not be enough to outweigh the altered costs C.
Because of the insuﬃciency of Downs’ initial model in accounting for turnout
(Aldrich 1993; Riker and Ordeshook 1968), an additional variable was added:
R = PB   C +D (2.2)
where
R = the utility of voting.
P = the probability of casting a decisive vote.
B = the benefits perceived of having one candidate win over another.
C = the costs incurred by the act of voting.
D = civic and/or psychological benefit of voting.
The addition of the variable D represents additional benefits received from
voting that aren’t included in the benefits PB, such as “the satisfaction from
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compliance with the ethic of voting, the satisfaction from aﬃrming allegiance
to the political system, the satisfaction from aﬃrming a partisan preference,
the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc., [and] the satisfaction of
aﬃrming one’s eﬃcacy in the political system” (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 28):
D =
nX
i=1
di (2.3)
where
di = the individual components that comprise the additional benefits D.
The diﬀerence between C and D represents the net costs of voting, which can
be either positive or negative.
As in the initial model, the interaction term benefits PB vary significantly
across elections. In high-visibility, high-salience elections like presidential con-
tests, most voters assign high values for the benefits B, and a non-zero value
to the probability P of casting a decisive vote (especially if the state is consid-
ered a “swing” state), allowing the interaction term benefits PB to significantly
influence the utility of voting R.
Conventional voter types can be identified using this model. For a habitual
voter, D is a variable that is always strong enough to drive turnout irrespective
of the values of the interaction term benefits PB or costs C:
PB +D   C > 0 for PB > 0. (2.4)
D   C > 0 for PB = 0. (2.5)
For swing state habitual voters (2.4), the interaction term benefits PB become
the additional benefit to turnout. In non-swing states (2.5), the interaction term
benefits PB are an unrealized benefit.
The episodic voter, on the other hand, frequently (but not always) finds that
the costs C exceed the total benefits PB +D:
PB +D   C > 0 () Participation. (2.6)
PB +D   C  0 () No Participation. (2.7)
For a typical nonvoter, it is reasonable to assume that the civic and psycho-
logical benefits D are almost always valued at or near zero. It is also reasonable
to assume the same for the benefits B, making the interaction term benefits
PB equal to zero as well. A nonvoter’s utility of voting is therefore essentially
determined by  C, which results in their consistent absence at the polls.
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For any voter participating in a large contest, the probability P that his or
her vote will be decisive is extremely small. In this case, the value of P , and
thus the interaction term benefits PB, is always zero or nearly zero, suggesting
that the real determinant of turnout comes down to the interplay between D
and C—the net costs of voting. The conventional habitual voter’s civic and
psychological benefits D always outweigh the costs C. For episodic voters,
the variables find themselves in flux, with turnout determined by whether the
benefits D exceed the costs C on Election Day.
The model proposed by Downs, and later refined by Riker and Ordeshook,
and Aldrich, does not account for the altruistic nature of some voters that
can change turnout incentives. Fowler (2006) provides an argument for the
infusion of altruism within the model. “Although the probability that a single
vote aﬀects the outcome of an election is quite small, the number of people who
enjoy the benefit when the preferred alternative wins is large. As a result, people
who care about benefits to others and who think one of the alternatives makes
others better oﬀ are more likely to vote” (Fowler 2006, 674). Altruism adds new
information into the valuation of the benefits B, allowing it to take on a larger
value than in previous models. This may reduce the impact of a low-valued or
approximately zero-valued probability P of casting a decisive vote. However,
regardless of the value of the benefits B, if the probability P of casting a decisive
vote is still essentially zero, the value of the interaction term benefits PB will
likewise be essentially zero irrespective of increased potential benefits.
Regardless of the model in use, there are diﬀering factors such as age, sex,
race, marital status, income, education, and occupation, that determine what
sorts of costs C a voter will incur:
C =
nX
i=1
ci (2.8)
where
ci = the individual components that comprise the costs C.
Thus, for most voters, whether or not they vote depends on the net costs D C,
essentially a cost-benefit analysis:
D   C > 0 () Participation. (2.9)
D   C  0 () No Participation. (2.10)
These models’ parameters are influenced by socioeconomic factors, legal bar-
riers, and the political context of the election in question (Kenney and Rice
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1985). Take, for instance, income. A person with a low income may be very hes-
itant to give up any time on a particular Tuesday to vote, because the marginal
cost of voting is so high. In contrast, the opportunity costs of voting may be
substantially less because of lower marginal costs. Diﬀerent voters experience
diﬀerent sets of costs with respect to their decision of whether to turnout or not
for an election.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to mitigate these costs through various
reforms of the voting methods used. Mary Fitzgerald (2005) finds that while
these reforms do make it more convenient to vote by reducing costs, they do
not generally have an eﬀect on participation. In particular, she finds that re-
forms like early voting do not have an eﬀect on turnout, and that states that
implement voting reforms tend to have high turnout rates already. These find-
ings suggest that some factor or set of factors other than the costs are driving
down participation. However, she does find two exceptions. The availability
Election Day registration is statistically significant, and has a positive eﬀect
on turnout, as does the National Voter Registration Act of 1993—commonly
called the “Motor Voter Act”—which allows for registration when getting a new
driver’s license.
Plutzer (2002) found that age was a determinant factor not only in turnout
generally, but in a voter’s development of habitual voting behavior. In the
initial stages of voting (usually when a voter first becomes eligible), the costs—
the barriers to entry, so to speak—are substantial enough to drive away large
portions of the newly eligible electorate. However, as time goes on and those
costs are eliminated one by one, development toward habitual behavior begins.
He further suggests that this behavior comes with inertia of its own, causing
it to be an evermore powerful force in the future. Temporary disruptions may
come about, but the inertia remains and picks up again at full force. Squire
et al. (1987) found that the disruption caused by moving is a significant cost,
similar to the costs experienced by those who just became eligible to vote. They
found the impact of moving on turnout to be quite substantial.
The turnout rate for the United States is generally around two-thirds of
the voting-age population (Pintor et al. 2002). This percentage represents the
turnout for the highest-salience and highest-visibility elections that the United
States holds—elections for the oﬃce of the president. Moving further down bal-
lot, races become generally less-salient and less-visible, causing turnout figures
for these races to be substantially lower than those for presidential races.
Considering that the costs are already incurred once a voter reaches the
booth, one explanation for this “rolloﬀ” down ballot comes simply from lack of
information that voters deem necessary to cast votes for these oﬃces (Watten-
berg et al. 2000). Matsusaka, who believes that “voter turnout patterns can be
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explained by extending the conventional rational voter model to include limited
information” (1995, 91), also supports this conclusion. He contends that more
information brings greater confidence in vote choice, which increases the utility
received from voting and leads to fewer instances of rolloﬀ.
In high-salience and high-visibility races, information is easy to acquire. Very
few people who go to vote for president of the United States are unsure of
how candidates diﬀer on major issues or which candidate they prefer. This
may be a product of the campaign cycle or simply from party identification
cues. Holbrook and McClurg (2005) found that the presidential campaigns
themselves have some impact on the turnout of both average voters and core
partisan groups, suggesting that campaign developments like scandals of gaﬀes,
incentivize non-habitual voters to come out and either support one candidate
or vote against another candidate.
2 Judging the Past, Predicting the Future
A subset of the literature on voter choice is built upon the idea of prospective
and retrospective evaluations. Prospective evaluations are assessments of a can-
didate’s or a party’s governing ability based upon what they promise to do once
elected. In contrast, retrospective evaluations are assessments of the record of a
candidate or a party in order to determine how they would govern once elected.
In particular, these evaluations are most often focused upon the state of the
economy and the status of war and peace during an election season.
Evaluations of this nature aﬀect not only the candidates and issues voters
choose to support, but can also have an impact on whether they choose to
turnout at all. During the 2008 presidential election, Senator John McCain’s
attempts to avoid comparisons with then-President George W. Bush were an
eﬀort to mitigate unfavorable retrospective evaluations about his party’s recent
tenure in the White House. In addition, the massive collapse of the economy
that began as Election Day was approaching triggered additional retrospective
evaluations made by voters. These evaluations caused many to believe that Sen-
ator McCain would not be a suitable candidate to direct repairs of the economic
system.
This argument is supported by Alvarez and Nagler (1998), who found that
the status of the economy had the greatest eﬀect on the 1996 presidential
election—more so than any social issue (though a few, like abortion, still had
some eﬀects). The state of the economy and retrospective evaluations made by
the voters favored incumbent Democratic President Bill Clinton’s policies over
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those of Republican Senator Bob Dole or those of third party candidate H. Ross
Perot.
In the turnout model proposed by Riker and Ordeshook (2.2), prospective
evaluations become part of the benefits B, accounting for the benefits associ-
ated with having one’s preferred candidate win over the alternative(s) or the
benefits associated with having one approach to addressing an issue supported
over another.
B =
nX
i=1
bi (2.11)
where
bi = the benefits perceived as a result of an evaluation.
Each individual evaluation bi has a value   0, and its magnitude depends on
the strength of the preferences (i.e. for indiﬀerence, bi would have a value of 0,
but the stronger the preference for one candidate or approach to addressing an
issue over an alternative, the closer the value of bi and thus B is to 1):
Increasing Preference Strength = bi !1. (2.12)
Decreasing Preference Strength = bi ! 0. (2.13)
3 Assigning Responsibility to Government
An additional subset of the voter turnout literature is the concept of functional
assignment. Functional assignment refers to the tendency of voters to assign
diﬀerent responsibilities to government jurisdictions across administrative lev-
els (local, state and federal). For example, it is unlikely that anyone at the
local level will have the authority to either protect a woman’s right to abortion
services or eliminate those rights all together. However, at the state level this
authority increases. At the federal level, this authority is maximized. Because
of these diﬀerences in authority and scope, voters will assign a set of function for
which diﬀerent government administrative levels are responsible. From there,
each voter will choose how to cast their votes based upon their preferences.
Robert Stein (1990) finds that when voters assign functional responsibilities
to diﬀerent federal oﬃces, those assignments determine the subjects upon which
they make prospective and retrospective evaluations. From these diﬀerences in
functional assignment come diﬀerent evaluations across government administra-
tive levels, which in turn cause diﬀerent voter choices at each level. With respect
to the economy, Stein finds that voters tend to think of it as the responsibility
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of the federal government. Voters therefore evaluate candidates for federal oﬃce
more on economic grounds than candidates for lower-level oﬃces.
This finding is supported by Hibbing and Alford (1982) who found that
voting for congressional candidates can be a referendum on the party of the
president, though this only occurs in a limited fashion (such as the midterm
election phenomenon that, since 1930, has seen an average loss of 30 seats in the
House of Representatives and four seats in the Senate for the sitting president’s
Party).
If functional assignment is indeed the case for variations in voter choice down-
ballot, then it is possible that voters exist in a variety of groups, some of which
nest and others of which do not. These voters have preferences, and exercise
those preferences in the voting booth. As a consequence, there may be some
voters who are only concerned with functions that they assign to the federal
government, while others may be concerned with functions that they assign to
both state and federal governments. And, of course, there remain voters who are
concerned with functions that transcend all government administrative levels,
and choose to vote across all of those levels. Figure 2.1 is a diagrammatical
representation of this concept.
Voters in all elections
Voters in state and federal elections
Voters in federal elections only
Federal
Elections
Local
Elections
Figure 2.1: A simple model of voter specialization with functional assignment
by government administrative level.
In some cases voters are interested in functions that they assign specifically to
one administrative level of government (white). In other cases they are inter-
ested in functions that they assign among two levels (light grey). Finally, there
are voters who are interested in functions that they assign among all three levels
(dark grey).
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However, this can be further extended to show that choice does not neces-
sarily depend exclusively on the top-down specialization structure of Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.2 shows groups of voters whose choice is determined by some other
factor. These may be shared among levels (as seen in clusters 2 and 4), limited
to one level (as seen in cluster 3), or extra-governmental all together (as seen in
cluster 1).
2
3
4
1
Unique Voter Clusters
Figure 2.2: A simple model of voter specialization with satellite groups
forming unique specializations outside of conventional voter typologies.
To relate functional assignment to the Riker and Ordeshook turnout model
(2.2), the definitions of some of the variables must be altered. Functional as-
signment causes a subset of factors to emerge in the benefits B that allow it
to have a value large enough to overcome the negating qualities of the costs C
and an approximately-zero valued probability P of casting a decisive vote. The
benefits B can then be decomposed into two components: conventional benefit
factors bi and functional assignment benefit factors bf .
B =
nX
i=1
bi +
nX
f=1
bf (2.14)
The functional assignment variables come into play when those subjects appear
in a contest, and their magnitudes are determined by how strongly a voter feels
about those subjects. Much like in (2.12) and (2.13), the values of bi and bf can
approach 1 in order to oﬀset the costs C and a zero probability P of casting
a decisive vote. From this new definition of B, functional assignment has an
eﬀect on turnout only when those issues are present in an election (and thusPn
f=1 bf > 0).
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Chapter 3
Theory and Hypotheses
In local (and non-partisan or issue elections in particular), the probability P
of casting a decisive vote can have a positive value that does not equal zero,
allowing the PB variables to come into play. For example, in my hometown of
New Castle, Colorado, an election in April of 2012 for three city council seats
had fourth place candidate Merle Means lose by only seven votes. In this case,
the probability that a single person’s vote could have made a diﬀerence was
quite significant.
The distinction for local elections comes down to the benefits B, much like
in functional assignment. If functionally-assigned issues do not come up with
regularity, a voter has no incentive to turnout when those issues are not present.
Thus, a voter may have the appearance of being an episodic voter when he or
she may not be. Rather, like my father, this voter has formed his or her habit
around something other than the act of voting.
I suggest that part of functional assignment includes the specialization of
voters in certain types of issues or elections. In the cases where these factors
are absent (
Pn
f=1 bf = 0), the costs C exceed the benefits PB +D and voting
does not occur. However, when these factors are present in an election andPn
f=1 bf > 0, voting always occurs. I oﬀer the following model based upon
those proposed by Downs, Riker and Ordeshook, and Aldrich:
R = P
0@ nX
f=1
bf +
nX
i=1
bi
1A  C +D (3.1)
Consider the aforementioned example of a farmer who is concerned with
water rights because of the need to irrigate his or her crops. This farmer, for
whatever reasons, may not have any other interests in politics—he or she may
not care about federal, state or local government in any other situation unless
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agricultural issues are present. Thus, unless these issues appear regularly on
ballots, the farmer may appear to be an episodic voter, when in reality he or
she is a habitual voter when it comes to those specific issues.
My thesis questions whether these outlying voters exist in practice, and if
they do, whether they make their decisions to participate based on some form of
functional assignment or whether the conventional models of voting still hold.
My theory is that there may be voters who specialize in elections based on the
type of election or the nature of ballot content; specifically, that there are voters
who specialize in local elections and avoid participation in higher-level elections.
These voters, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, do not fit neatly into the nested Venn
diagram, but instead exist as a satellite group that intersect the other groups
when they share elections in common.
I expect to find this phenomenon at the local level rather than the national
level because local elections are where races and ballot initiatives are substan-
tially more issue-based than candidate-based, and where information is harder
to come by for the average voter. In these elections, voters seek out information
from family, friends, and acquaintances (Adrian 1958), adding a personal aspect
to the benefits B and D. I propose the following hypotheses for describing the
characteristics of voters specializing in local elections:
1. Local specialists are more likely to be older voters.
2. Local specialists are more likely to come from rural counties.
3. Local specialists may specialize in types of issues.
4. Local specialists are less likely to be partisans.
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Chapter 4
Research Design
My thesis involves an attempt to establish a new voting typology. A statistical
tool particularly well suited for finding these correlations is Q methodology
factor analysis. Q methodology factor analysis is a statistical method for finding
correlations among groups of people. It is similar to normal factor analysis
(known as the “R” method), which involves finding correlations among variables
across a set of observations. Q methodology accomplishes this same statistical
process, but first transposes the data so that observations become the variables
and variables become the observations. In my case, the voters become the
variables and the elections become the observations.
The factor analysis process then reduces the electoral behavior of voters down
to a few “factors,” (hence, factor analysis), indicating shared political behavior—
which in my case are shared types of voting behavior, or a classification of
voter types—represented as Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcients.
If a voter typology for local specialists is found, I can attempt to explain that
factor through the use of multivariate regression analysis of those correlation
coeﬃcients on the measures of voter characteristics I listed as my hypotheses.
1 Data
The data from the Ohio Secretary of State come from two sources. The first are
validated voter files, which include participatory information for each registered
voter in the state. The second are election results, which include turnout figures
for elections and issues, and the corresponding jurisdictions in which the various
elections were held.
19
2 The Case for Ohio
Conducting research of this nature would be overwhelming when using data from
all fifty states, not to mention financially diﬃcult. It is therefore necessary, as
is so often the case with this kind of research, to sample from the available data
the best representation of the country as a whole, and Ohio is a prime candidate.
For years, Ohio has been popularly considered a microcosm of the United
States in a variety of ways (Green and Coﬀey 2011). Since 1896, the state of Ohio
has allocated its Electoral College votes to the winner of the presidential election
in every contest except for 1944 and 1960, when its votes went to Thomas E.
Dewey and Richard Nixon, respectively. It currently holds the longest-running
perfect prediction streak (since 1960), with a success rate of approximately
93% since the 1896 election between William McKinley and William Jennings
Bryan. Taking a weeklong journey across the state, CNN journalist Richard
Quest (2011) discovered that it reflects America’s social and economic diversity
as well, and even does so geographically.
“Ohio is a microcosm of the entire United States. The major newspa-
per, The Plain Dealer, has called it ‘The Five Ohios,’ with diﬀering
economies and politics. The northeast for instance, which includes
Cleveland, and where the voters traditionally turn democrat. The
Southwest, which is deeply conservative and traditionally votes re-
publican. And in between, a huge farming belt (where church and
family are strong), a desperately poor Appalachia region with the
highest concentration of Veterans in the U.S., and a central region
which is suburbia personified. This is America writ small.”
Quest is not alone in his assessment of Ohio. Others have both echoed and
preceded his remarks with similar conclusions (Green and Coﬀey 2011). An
article written by journalist Wesley Morris (2006) at the Boston Globe a day
before the 2006 midterm election reiterated the oft-quoted adage “. . . so goes
the nation”—a phrase frequently attributed to Ohio when describing it as “a
microcosm of [the] country’s fractures.” The Economist (2008) quotes Jason
Mauk, the executive director of the Ohio Republican Party, who claims that
“this is where national politicians go to get a gut check on middle America.”
Similar stories (Niquette 2011) exist in more recent news showing Ohio as a
reflection of the debt crisis in America.
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3 Data Strengths and Weaknesses
The validated voter files include both descriptive and participatory data for all
voters registered within the State of Ohio. Included for each voter record are
individual state and county voter identification numbers, physical and mailing
address information, year of birth, registration date, partisan aﬃliation, political
jurisdictions in which they reside (like school districts, precincts, counties, state
and federal legislative districts, court districts, etc.), and elections for which
they received and turned in a ballot. These data cover elections held between
2000 and 2012. It includes four presidential elections, three midterm elections,
as well as several primary elections and special elections.
These data allow for the prediction of voter characteristics, such as income
(based upon neighborhood attributes), partisanship (through participation in
partisan elections like primaries), and approximate age, as well as more gen-
eral characteristics like the types of elections held in Ohio (general, special, or
primary) and the number of voters in any given jurisdiction. In addition, the
election results tabulations list turnout figures for each candidate and ballot
question by county, and indicate broad categories of types of issues on each
county’s ballot, reported by the Ohio Secretary of State as bond, tax, local
options, and miscellaneous.
However, there are data in both the validated voter files and election results
tabulations that are inconsistently reported by the secretary of state in one data
set but not the other. There are election data within the validated voter files for
which there is no documentation in the election results tabulations, and there
are results for elections held that do not appear as data in the validated voter
files. For a complete list of these missing data, see the appendix.
Another limitation of the data involves party registration. I had to make
the assumption that any voter with a party aﬃliation held that aﬃliation for
the duration of the available data. Therefore, anyone with a party aﬃliation
and a participatory mark in a primary election was listed as a participant in
an election for which they were eligible. Anyone with a party aﬃliation and no
participatory mark in a primary election was listed as a non-participant in an
election for which they were eligible. All others (those without party aﬃliation)
were listed as non-participants in elections for which they were not eligible to
participate. In other words, voters are either partisans or non-partisans. If they
are partisans, they are eligible for all primary elections, and they can be listed
as participants or non-participants. For non-partisans, they are not eligible for
any primary elections, so they are only listed as non-participants.
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4 Method
4.1 Data Manipulation
The first step was to download the most recent available set of validated voter
files from the Ohio Secretary of State. For this thesis, I used a set current as
of February 5, 2013. These data are designed for use by political campaigns,
and do not come in a format that is initially useful to social scientists. In order
to perform my proposed statistical analyses, some data transformations were
necessary. In order to perform any kind of statistical analysis, some variables
had to be recoded.
A voter’s participation in non-primary elections is indicated by an “X,” while
participation in a primary election is indicated by a party label (such as “D”
for Democratic and “R” for Republican). Also, there are no time series data
for partisan aﬃliation (as mentioned in Section 3) or for indications of a voter’s
death, and thus removal as an active voter. Because these files are intended for
use by political campaigns, it is not unreasonable to assume that part of the
weekly updates include the removal of deceased voters’ records.1
Using SAS software, new variables were created. If a voter participated in
a general election, that record was coded as 1. If a voter did not participate
but had a registration date prior to the date the general election was held, that
record was coded as 0. If a voter did not participate and was not yet registered,
that record didn’t receive any coding, remaining blank.
For primary elections the same method was used, however a party registra-
tion variable was added as a qualifier. If a voter held a party registration, that
record was coded as 1. If a voter did not hold a party registration, that voter
was coded as 0. The primary election variables were then coded as 1 for partic-
ipation and 0 for participation if the partisan variable was coded as 1. Records
without partisan aﬃliation received no coding, remaining blank.
For special elections, eligibility by jurisdiction was first determined, also
coded as a binary variable, which was then included as a qualifier. If a voter
participated in a special election, that record was coded as 1. If a voter did not
participate in a special election but they were eligible to, that record was coded
as 0. All other voters received no coding, and remained blank.
1My adviser informs me that this is a reasonable assumption for most states, but not
Illinois, where voters continue to cast ballots for years after they die. For more information,
see Ballotpedia’s article on “Dead People Voting” at http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.
php/Dead_people_voting.
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4.2 Random Sampling
The transposition of the data would create 8,012,341 variables, which exceeds
the capacity limits of SAS when performing a factor analysis. Additionally, this
analysis requires that the voters be eligible to participate in the local elections
(there cannot be any blanks or missing data). Two of the special elections
(February 8, 2005 and February 7, 2006) were held in relatively few jurisdictions,
so I opted to drop them from the analysis in order to have a more diverse group
of eligible voters from which to sample.
The sampling strategy I employed restricted the population to all people
for whom eligibility for the four remaining special elections was greater than or
equal to zero, meaning, regardless of participation, they were at least eligible to
participate. This reduced the population from which I could sample to 475,221
voters. The SAS software was only able to transpose my data set when it
contained approximately 1,500 variables given the hardware configuration of
the laboratory computer. Because of these hardware and software restrictions,
I had to take a random sample in order to do the factor analysis. I took a
random sample of 1,532 voters based on the following sample size formula:
ssn=1 =
z2(p)(1  p)
c2
(4.1)
where
ssn=1 = sample size for an infinite population,
z = confidence level (95% is equivalent to z = 1.96),
p = expected frequency value (50% is equivalent to 0.5),
c = confidence interval (±2.5% is equivalent to c = 0.025),
and adjusting for a finite population size n = 475, 221:
ssn=475,221 =
ssn=1
1 + [(ssn=1)  1]n 1 (4.2)
allocates a sample size of 1532 with 95% confidence ±2.5%.
4.3 Q Methodology Factor Analysis
Using these sample data, I kept variables for the voter identification numbers
and the new binary election participation variables. I then transposed the data
so that each voter became a variable and each election became an observation.
Using this transposed data set, I ran a factor analysis retaining the top five
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factors sorted by eigenvalue using a standard varimax rotation. I chose to limit
the analysis to five factors in order to account for five possible voter types, which
I hypothesized would be the following, given the available data:
1. Voters participating in all elections.
2. Voters participating in presidential elections.
3. Voters participating in federal elections.
4. Voters participating in local elections.
5. Voters participating in partisan elections.
A factor analysis without any restriction on the number of factors retained
produced a total of eight factors, all of which had eigenvalues greater than one
and together accounted for 100% of the observed variation. However, bivariate
regression tables created for five, six, seven, and eight retained factors did not
show any significant insights gained from the inclusion of more than five factors.
A scree test of the factor variance also indicated that five factors should be
retained. These five voter types allow me to control for the various permutations
of voters conventionally identified, as well as for the non-partisan and local
specialists with which my thesis is concerned.
4.4 Bivariate Regression Analysis
The Q methodology analysis identified five factors, and provided each voter
with a Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcient for how highly they load
on that factor with other similar voters. To determine which factors accounted
for which types of voters, I sorted the sample data by each factor to see what
the diﬀerences were between the voters with highly positive correlations and
the voters with highly negative correlations. Using this “inter-ocular” test, I
was only able to distinguish the two types listed in Chapter 5: the habitual
voters and the federal specialists. The other factors appeared to be various
distributions of voting behavior in between these two specializations, but none
appeared to follow any of the established voting typologies aside from Factor 1.
To determine which factor corresponded with the local specialists, I first
created several new participation variables for each voter. The first was the
proportion of all elections in which they participated given their eligibility for
each of those elections (total). Second, I created a variable for the proportion
of all presidential elections in which they participated given their eligibility
for those elections (pres). Third, I created a variable for the proportion of
all federal elections in which they participated given their eligibility for those
elections (fed). Fourth, I created a variable for the proportion of all local
elections in which they participated given their eligibility for those elections
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(local). Finally, I created a variable for the proportion of all partisan elections
(primary and general elections) in which they participated given their eligibility
for those elections (partisan). To determine which of the factors corresponded
most highly to the various participation-proportion variables I had created, I
performed a series of bivariate regressions of each factor on each of the five
proportion variables.
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Chapter 5
Data Analysis
The following data are the results of the factor analysis.
Factor Eigenvalue Diﬀerence Proportion Cumulative
1 614.25 438.09 0.4467 0.4467
2 176.17 20.50 0.1281 0.5749
3 155.67 43.25 0.1132 0.6881
4 112.42 5.03 0.0818 0.7698
5 107.39 25.00 0.0781 0.8479
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix:
Total 1375
Mean 0.8952
Table 5.1: Q Methodology Factor Analysis Results.
The following table indicates the variance explained by retaining five factors
using a standard varimax rotation.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
493.88 207.82 171.97 164.93 127.31
Table 5.2: Variance Explained by Each Factor.
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Once each voter was given a Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcient
for each of the five factors, I added this information into the original sample
data. Using these data, I performed the bivariate regressions of the factors on
each of the participation-proportion variables. The results are listed in Table
5.3.
total pres fed local partisan
Factor 1  0.68 3.09 14.63  25.12 5.43
Factor 2 3.45 2.84 4.75  2.22 4.71
Factor 3 1.73 1.78 2.03 1.07 1.88
Factor 4  16.45  10.74  8.66  17.57  14.01
Factor 5 4.14 3.76 4.37 1.94 4.34
Table 5.3: Bivariate Regression of Factors on Participation-Proportions.
These bivariate regression results indicate that those voters correlating highly
positively on Factor 1 participate (almost) exclusively in biennial federal elec-
tions. These voters correspond to the group of federal specialists in Figure 2.1.
The opposite of these voters (those with a highly negative correlation to Fac-
tor 1) are those who participate in nearly all available elections, from the federal
level to the state level. These voters correspond to the habitual voters (dark
grey) in Figure 2.1.
It is reasonable to assume that, given the strong confirmation of both the
federal specialists and the habitual participants, there also exist voters who focus
their eﬀorts toward federal and state elections, but avoid local elections (as also
illustrated in Figure 2.1). Voters without correlation to any of the five factors
(there are 161 in the sample) are the non-voters. They registered as voters
before the general election in November of 2000, but have never participated in
an election. It is probable that they were registered without their direct input,
as it seems unlikely that a large number of voters would take the time to register
to vote but never participate.
Unfortunately, these results do not indicate the presence of local specialists
in the sample. However, the results do rather strongly confirm the existence of
federal specialists and habitual voters. In particular, it shows that voters par-
ticipating in the special elections are also participating in the biennial federal
elections. Given that voting typologies can be determined with this factor anal-
ysis, it is still worthwhile to attempt to explain what may drive these Factor 1
voter specializations, in particular, what makes the federal specialists diﬀerent
from the habitual voters. The hypotheses I listed in Chapter 3 are still viable
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tests for describing the characteristics of the voters who do participate in local
elections. Here are those hypotheses for reference:
1. Local specialists are more likely to be older voters.
2. Local specialists are more likely to come from rural counties.
3. Local specialists may specialize in types of issues.
4. Local specialists are less likely to be partisans.
Once these voter types were identified through these bivariate regressions, I
turned to multivariate regression to test the hypotheses I proposed in Chapter 3.
These analyses allowed me to find which (if any) of those hypotheses could
explain some of the characteristics that defined the voters that had participated
in local elections as compared to the federal specialists.
Measures for county rurality were obtained from the United States Bureau of
the Census as county population densities given as population per square mile.
Voter age is included in the validated voter files as year of birth. The Ohio
Secretary of State classifies issues into four categories: tax, bond, local options,
and miscellaneous. Using these classifications, the presence of these issue types
in an election was coded as 1, while absence of them was coded as 0. Using these
presence variables, new variables were created indicating the proportion of local
elections that contained each of the issue types in which a voter participated.
These variables were used as the regressors in the multivariate analyses.
To test for these characteristics of habitual voters, I performed a multivari-
ate regression of the Factor 1 Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcients
on the measures of voter age (year of birth), county rurality (population per
square mile), the presence of bond, tax, local, and miscellaneous issues in the
local election as defined by the Ohio Secretary of State, and the measure of
partisanship where aﬃliated partisans were coded as 1 and unaﬃliated voters
were coded as 0. The results are listed in Table (5.4).
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Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error P > |t|
Intercept 0.7919179 0.5274546 0.134
Voter Age  0.000136 0.0002696 0.614
County Rurality 0.0000386 0.0000194 0.047
Bond Issues Present 0.1766607 0.0535549 0.001
Tax Issues Present  0.8820273 0.0969671 0.000
Local Issues Present  0.0009135 0.0358602 0.980
Miscellaneous Issues Present  0.0366869 0.0671222 0.585
Partisanship 0.2749489 0.0182493 0.000
n 1000
R2 0.4246
Adjusted R2 0.4206
Root Mean Squared Error 0.25418
Table 5.4: Regression Estimates for Characteristics of Factor 1.
I found that county rurality is significant at a significance level of ↵ = 5%.
This suggests that as counties become more urban (population per square mile
increases), voters correlate more highly on Factor 1, indicating that the habitual
participants (highly negatively correlated to Factor 1) are more likely to come
from rural areas. This lends support to my second hypothesis, where I suggested
that participants in local elections are more likely to come from rural counties.
In addition to county rurality, I find that the presence of bond and tax issues in
a local election is significant at a significance level of ↵ = 0.1%. The coeﬃcient
on bond issues is positive, indicating that the habitual participants (again, those
with a highly negative correlation on Factor 1) are less likely to specialize in
bond issues. The opposite is the case for tax issues, with a strong negative
coeﬃcient suggesting that habitual participants are highly likely to participate
in elections which include tax issues.
I believe the reason for this distinction between bond and tax issues is the
result of perceived benefits and losses. The taxes voted on during these spe-
cial elections tend to be county-wide taxes or mill levies on all properties in a
jurisdiction, which aﬀect a large number of voters directly. In contrast, bond
issues are merely authorizations for a school district or similar organization to
borrow money to fund an expansion or renovation of facilities. Often (though
not always), these bond issues make use of existing tax revenues to make in-
terest and principal payments, or extend existing taxes into the future rather
30
than implementing new taxes. Therefore, these bond issues do not often af-
fect the status quo, and the benefits are particularized to a certain school or
organization, further reducing participation incentives.
The only explanation I can oﬀer for why the local options and miscellaneous
issues are not a statistically significant determinant for turnout is that the ha-
bitual voters participating in these special elections will cast a ballot regardless
of the presence of those issues. However, this should also be the case for the
presence of bond and tax issues, yet they do have statistically significant eﬀects.
Further analysis of these eﬀects is warranted.
Regardless, these results lend some support to my third hypothesis, suggest-
ing that there are at least some types of issues that local participants specialize
in, which drive them to the polls when these issues appear on a ballot. Fi-
nally, I found partisanship to be significant at a significance level of ↵ = 0.1%.
This provides support to my fourth hypothesis, indicating that voters correlat-
ing highly on Factor 1 (federal specialists) are more likely to be partisan than
voters correlating highly negatively on Factor 1 (habitual voters). Age is not
significant at any reasonable significance level of ↵, so I did not find any support
for my first hypothesis.
Given these explanatory factors, I performed a second multivariate regres-
sion of local participation on the explanatory variables used in the previous
regression to see if I could find further evidence of what drives these habit-
ual voters to the polls during local elections. To explore this, I regressed each
voter’s average local participation (the proportion of eligible local elections in
which they participated) on the measures for county rurality, age, partisanship,
and the four local issues designations. I also controlled for the proportion of
federal elections in which they participated. These regression results are listed
in Table 5.5.
31
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error P > |t|
Intercept  0.7860528 0.4915080 0.110
Voter Age 0.0002863 0.0002516 0.255
County Rurality  0.0000469 0.0000181 0.010
Bond Issues Present  0.1320503 0.0500041 0.008
Tax Issues Present 0.6924378 0.0904166 0.000
Local Issues Present  00164604 0.0334261 0.623
Miscellaneous Issues Present 0.0107394 0.0626347 0.864
Partisanship  0.2017659 0.0170441 0.000
Average Federal Participation 0.6350413 0.0305130 0.000
n 1000
R2 0.4544
Adjusted R2 0.4500
Root Mean Squared Error 0.23686
Table 5.5: Regression Estimates for Characteristics of Local Election
Participants.
These results mirror those from the first multivariate regression. They sug-
gest that those who participate in local elections also participate in federal
elections. In addition, they suggest that partisans do participate less frequently
at the local level than do non-partisans, and those from more rural counties are
more likely to participate in local elections. In terms of issue presence at the
local level, I found the presence of tax issues to be a strong indicator of turnout,
and the presence of bond issues to have a somewhat negative eﬀect on turnout.
As before, there was no statistically significant eﬀect of a voter’s age on their
participation in local elections.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Though I was not able to find support for my theory that there is a voting
typology for local election specialists, I was able to discover some interesting
characteristics that local election participants seem to have in common. One
of these characteristics was the tendency to be non-partisan. This finding is
supported by Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw (2004), who found that there is an eﬀect
of partisanship of voter turnout. Specifically, they discovered that voters with
partisan aﬃliations in what they call “enemy territory”—such as a Republican in
San Francisco, California or a Democrat in Provo, Utah—tend to vote less than
expected given shared characteristics with other voters in more ideologically
homogeneous locations. Because of the nonpartisan nature of many local elec-
tions, I would not expect to find this eﬀect to be as strong, and thus the finding
that local participants are less-often partisans is consistent with the findings of
Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw.
Another characteristic of local election participants was their tendency to
come from more rural counties. Fortunately for my analysis, a large majority of
counties in Ohio are not vastly diﬀerent in size (see Figure 6.1, Table 6.1).1 This
helps to mitigate the appearance of large cities in large counties as equivalent
to smaller, rural counties in terms of population density. This adds strength to
the finding that local voters are more likely to be participating in more rural
counties. It is probable that rural voters face fewer opportunity costs when
deciding to vote, such as shorter lines due to fewer voters.
1Note: Statistics other than count given in square miles.
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Figure 6.1: Land Area Distribution of Ohio Counties.
Count (n) Min. Max. Mean (µ) Median St. Dev. ( )
88 228.21 702.44 465.32 439.07 89.72
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Land Area of Ohio Counties.
I was also able to find a correlation between local election participation and
the presence of tax issues. However, interpretation of these data require some
careful thought. Two possible explanations for this correlation come to mind.
First, it may be that, indeed, the voters have a strong interest in expressing
their opinions regarding tax policy. However, it may also be the case that there
just happen to be tax issues present in all four of the special elections in this
analysis, and that participation of the habitual voters in these local elections
exactly mirrors the proportion of local elections with tax issues present. Since
the analysis was only able to use only around 20%2 of the number of special
elections reportedly held, more diversity in these local races could be able to
provide more variation in the presence of these issues, thereby providing more
meaningful insights on the impacts of these types of issues.
These issue-specialization coeﬃcients suggest the need for a diﬀerent method
by which to measure their inclusion on a ballot. The Ohio Secretary of State
data only give a broad classification, such as “there were miscellaneous issues on
the Ashtabula County ballot during the May 6, 2003 special election.” This sort
of data generalization represents one of the largest limitations to the analysis.
2Though the analysis uses four out of the six total special elections listed in the validated
voter files, there are nineteen total special elections reported between the validated voter files
and the election results tabulations. Thirteen of these special elections were missing from the
validated voter files. For a list of these elections, see the appendix.
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Generalizations had to be made across many variables in order to account for
shortcomings in the data as reported from the Ohio Secretary of State.
It is important to remember that these data are made available for use by
political campaigns, not political scientists. As a result, more care seems to have
been put into the reporting of data relevant to campaigns, like participation in
general and primary elections and current party aﬃliation—data of particular
use to campaigns. The data are also not consistent in how information is re-
ported, likely due to the work of many people inputting data. For example,
Washington Township is listed in one of four ways: Washington, Washington
Twp, Wash. Twp, and Washington Twp. There are also a number of voters who
were listed as having been born in the year 1800. While these people must have
fascinating historical insight into the early days of the Republic, something tells
me these data are in error.
It is interesting to note that, in addition to being unable to find local spe-
cialists, I was also unable to identify a voter type that specialized only in presi-
dential elections. This suggests one of several possibilities, since it is reasonable
to conclude that there should be some presidential specialists (like my grand-
mother). The election results data from the Ohio secretary of State show that
there is a significant diﬀerence (approximately 20%) in turnout between presi-
dential election years and midterm election years. These data are listed in Table
6.2.
Election Type and Year Turnout Percentage Diﬀerence
General (2000) 63.60%
16.42%
Midterm (2002) 47.18%
General (2004) 71.77%
18.52%
Midterm (2006) 53.25%
General (2008) 69.97%
20.42%
Midterm (2010) 49.22%
General (2012) 70.51%
Mean General Turnout (2000–2012) 68.96%
19.08%
Mean Midterm Turnout (2002–2010) 49.88%
Table 6.2: Turnout Rates in Ohio for Presidential and Midterm Election Years.
One possibility is that there may be errors either in my coding of election
participation across the voters or in the factor analysis on dichotomous variables.
Another possibility is that there may simply not be but a few presidential spe-
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cialists in Ohio, though this seems an unlikely reality. Further, this lack of a
clear presidential specialist category might suggest that there still may be local
specialists as well, but these data are insuﬃciently precise to distinguish them
from the more general, established voting typologies. In addition, the large
number of missing special elections not included in the validated voter files
severely limits the number of elections in which a local specialist could partic-
ipate. With seventeen special elections instead of four, it is possible that there
would be enough data to distinguish local specialists from other conventional
voting typologies.
It should also be mentioned that there are local issues present in each of the
biennial federal elections. A portion of the habitual voters who participate in
all available general and special elections could still be local election specialists,
but it would be impossible to distinguish that kind of participation given the
restrictions of the data and the use of the Australian ballot.
I suspect the most important finding of this research is the relationship
between population density and turnout in local elections. This provides some
important information for campaigns and candidates who are running races
and issues in low-information, low-salience, low visibility local races. Campaigns
that have issues or field candidates in local elections have a higher probability of
voters participating in these rural counties. Though campaigns may be tempted
to focus their eﬀorts in urban locations where more people can be reached and
cost per-capita of information dissemination is substantially less, my research
shows that these voters are already less likely to show up for oﬀ-cycle local races.
If plurality is the goal (which it is in most jurisdictions), campaign eﬀorts for
exclusively local races may be more eﬀective in gathering voter support in local
areas, especially if those local races occur across both urban and rural counties.
This research certainly provides an interesting foundation upon which to
build new voter typologies. A changing political landscape, altered by new
methods of communication (like social media) and voting opportunities (like
mail-in ballots, early voting, etc.), suggests that information and salience may
no longer be bound to follow the established hierarchy. Further research into
new voter typologies could provide some valuable insight into just what sorts
of specializations are voters beginning to develop as electoral landscapes shift
and information becomes far easier to acquire. My inability to find presidential
specialists leads me to believe that there may still be local specialists out there
somewhere.
A diﬀerent approach to searching for these elusive participants is warranted.
What might be particularly interesting would be to get information from in-
dividual ballots rather than individual voters over time. Ballots from a single
presidential election that includes federal oﬃces, state oﬃces, and local issues
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and elections could allow us to see just what proportions of an electorate are
checking only the boxes for president—and maybe, just what proportions are
checking only the boxes for local candidates and issues.
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Appendix: Missing Data
Data Missing from the Elections Results Tabula-
tions
The following data are listed as elections in the validated voter files, but no
results data are available from the Ohio Secretary of State.
Primary Election held on September 13, 2005
Primary Election held on September 11, 2007
Primary Election held on September 8, 2009
Primary Election held on September 15, 2009
Primary Election held on September 29, 2009
Primary Election held on September 7, 2010
Primary Election held on September 13, 2011
Data Missing from the Validated Voter Files
The following elections are available as results data from the Ohio Secretary of
State, but none are listed as elections in the validated voter files.
Special Election held on August 3, 2004
Special Primary Election held on June 14, 2005
Special Election held on August 2, 2005
Special Election held on August 8, 2006
Special Primary Election held on September 14, 2006
Special Primary Election held on September 15, 2006
Special Election held on February 6, 2007
Special Election held August 7, 2007
Special Election held on August 5, 2008
Special Election held on February 3, 2009
Special Election held on August 4, 2009
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Special Election held on February 2, 2010
Special Election held on August 3, 2010
Special Election held on February 8, 2011
Special Election held on August 2, 2011
Special Election held on August 7, 2012
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